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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over cases transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
This appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3). This appeal was subject to transfer by the 
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102(4). The Utah Supreme Court elected to transfer this case to the Court of 
Appeals in an order dated July 10, 2008. R. at 1117. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of the 
June 3, 2008, Order and Decision by the Honorable James R. Taylor granting 
summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills and dismissing the Harveys' 
disconnection petition. The ultimate legal question is whether or not the Harveys 
should be allowed to seek a disconnection from Cedar Hills. Included within this 
review are the following issues: 
I. Is there a material difference between the 2001 and 2003 
disconnection statutes with respect to the issue of unincorporated 
islands between cities? 
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II. Does the creation of an island of unincorporated territory completely 
surrounded by incorporated land absolutely determine the outcome in 
a disconnection matter under both 2001 and 2003 statutes? 
III. Should the substantive requirements of the 2003 amendments to the 
disconnection statute be retroactively applied in this 2001 case? 
IV. Are the Harveys entitled to present relevant evidence that supports 
the viability of the disconnection as well as demonstrates that the 
disconnection promotes the interests of justice and equity? 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
I. Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-503 (2001) - Criteria for disconnection: 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which 
the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would 
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. 
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all 
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on: (a) the city or 
community as a whole; (b) adjoining property owners; (c) existing or 
projected streets or public ways; (d) water mains and water services; (e) 
sewer mains and sewer services; (f) law enforcement; (g) zoning; (h) other 
municipal services; and (i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and 
varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the 
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be 
disconnected. 
II. Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-505(4) (2001) - The court shall order 
disconnection: 
Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall 
order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in 
Section 10-2-503. 
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III. Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003) - Unincorporated 
islands are not allowed: 
The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence:(a) the viability of the disconnection; (b) that justice and equity 
require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality; (c) that the 
proposed disconnection will not: (i) leave the municipality with an area 
within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of 
providing municipal services would materially increase over previous years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to 
continue to function as a municipality; or (iii) leave or create one or more 
islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and (d) that the county in 
which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-
effective manner amd without materially increasing the county's costs of 
providing municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the 
municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
IV. Utah Code Annotated. § 68-3-3, 1953 as Amended - Retroactive 
Effect: 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
V. "H.B. 98" 2003 General Session of the Utah State Legislature -
Session in which the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501 et 
seq. were passed: 
"The act modifies the criteria for disconnection and modifies the procedure 
for disconnection.'" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because this issue is a question of law, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial judge's determination and applies a "correctness" standard, 
deciding the matter for itself. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case that has been in litigation since 2001. R. at 13. In addition to 
the present disconnection matter filed by the Harveys, the City of Cedar Hills has 
filed a condemnation action, and the Harveys have filed a claim based on 
constitutional rights violations. R. at 23; 46. The companion case for 
condemnation filed by Cedar Hills (which has been consolidated into the present 
case but which was previously case number 010404045) and the companion claim 
filed by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for constitutional rights violations (which 
has been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number 
010404044) are not at issue at this time. R. at 1111. Pursuant to the order of the 
District court, these cases are stayed pending this appeal of this disconnection 
matter. Id. 
The parties filed various motions for summary judgment. R. at 148, 191, 
494. This appeal concerns only the most recent order of the district court filed on 
June 3, 2008, which granted summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills as to the 
disconnection issue. R. at 1112; Addendum at 61. 
On April 4, 2008, the court heard arguments on the Harveys1 Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment to Determine Appropriate Statutory Standard. R. at 
1010. Addendum at 29. The motion requested clarification on which version of 
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the Utah Restriction of Municipal Limits Act, Title 10, Chapter 2, part 5 of the 
Utah Code (hereinafter "the disconnection statute") was to be applied. R. at 750; 
Addendum at 21. 
At the hearing, the court elected to avoid making a decision as to which 
statute applied. R. at 1112; Addendum at 61. Instead, the court found that "there 
is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between the two versions 
of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection 
statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated island, the 
disconnection should be disallowed." See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111; 
Id. As a result, the court did not enter into an analysis of whether the 2003 
disconnection statute should be applied retroactively because the opinion of the 
court was that the disconnection petition would fail under either statute. Id. 
The Harveys appeal this order as an erroneous determination of law. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case. 
1. The appellants, David and Dixie Harvey, are the landowners of a 
parcel of land in Utah County which was annexed into Cedar Hills in 
1997. R. at 7; Addendum at 12. 
2. The property lies on the boundary between the cities of Cedar Hills 
and Pleasant Grove. R. at 6; Addendum at 19. 
3. Due to an on-going dispute with the city regarding zoning and use of 
their property, the Harveys filed a Petition to Disconnect from Cedar 
Hills in August 2001. R. at 7; Addendum at 12. 
4. Following the filing of the disconnection petition, the City of Cedar 
Hills filed a condemnation action seeking to condemn the Harveys' 
property for use as a city park. R. at 23. The Harveys filed an 
unconstitutional takings claim. The three cases were consolidated into 
one action and the district court determined that the disconnection 
matter should proceed first. R. at 1111; Addendum at 61. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the City of 
Cedar Hills in the disconnection matter. This ruling was based on the court's 
determination that there was no material difference between the 2001 and 2003 
disconnection statutes with respect to the dispositive issue of islands of 
unincorporated territory between cities. This determination ignores the plain, clear 
language of the 2001 statute that differs noticeably from the 2003 amendments in 
both the definition of an island and the significance that an unincorporated island 
should have in the final determination. 
While the Harveys' disconnection may be prohibited under the 2003 
amendments, it is not prohibited by the 2001 statute. The appropriate statutory 
standard is the 2001 statute because it was effective at the time this action was 
filed. The 2003 amendments modify the substantive law governing disconnection 
by creating new factors, new "criteria," the district court must consider in making 
its decision. As such, there should be no retroactive application of the 2003 
amendments. 
Under the 2001 statute, the City of Cedar Hills should not have been granted 
summary judgment and the Harveys should be given an opportunity to present 
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evidence supporting the viability of the disconnection as well as the fact that it 
promotes the interests of justice and equity. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE 2001 AND 2003 DISCONNECTION STATUTES WERE 
SUBSTANTIVELY IDENTICAL 
The district court ruled that under either the 2001 or 2003 disconnection 
statutes a disconnection petition must be denied where the proposed disconnection 
will create an island of unincorporated territory. At the hearing, both the court and 
counsel for Cedar Hills acknowledged that the 2003 amendments to the 
disconnection statute modified the weight that the court was to give to the issue of 
unincorporated islands. See Oral Argument Transcript, 19:15-25 (Addendum at 
47); 20:1-19 (Addendum at 48). R. at 1122. However, the court ultimately 
determined that the 2001 statute must have intended that the unincorporated island 
criteria be dispositive. Id., 24:19-20; Addendum at 52. Despite the court's 
acknowledgment that the 2001 statute did not contain plain language to that fact, 
the court proceeded to impute the legislative intent in this matter. Id., 24:12-13. 
The court's written order states that "there is no material difference on the 
dispositive point of law between the two versions of the statute at issue. Under 
either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection statute, if a disconnection 
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would result in an unincorporated island, the disconnection should be disallowed." 
See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111; Addendum at 61. 
The plain language of the two versions of the statutes do not support this 
ruling. Statutory construction begins and, if possible, ends with the statute's plain 
language. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2002); State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 990 
(Utah 1999). 
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its 
plain meaning. While the 2003 disconnection statute could reasonably be 
interpreted as prohibiting disconnection where an unincorporated island is created,, 
the 2001 disconnection statute is materially different on that point. The Harveys 
appeal the district court's decision on this issue as an erroneous interpretation of 
the law. 
A- The 2003 Disconnection Statute Clearly Disallows Unincorporated 
Islands 
Under the 2003 version of the disconnection statute, the provisions 
regarding the creation of islands of unincorporated territory are unambiguous. The 
statute expressly provides that the burden of proof is on the petitioners who must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed disconnection will not 
leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory. This 
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provision clearly states that if an island of unincorporated territory is created by the 
disconnection then the disconnection petition must be denied: 
The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . ( c ) that the proposed disconnection 
will not . . . (iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory; 
Utah Code. Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003); Addendum at 4. 
B. The 2001 Disconnection Statute only Disallows Unincorporated 
Islands "within95 the Boundaries of the Municipality from which 
the Territory is to be Disconnected. 
Contrary to the opinion of the district court, the 2001 version of the 
disconnection statute contains no mandate for denying a petition that creates an 
island of unincorporated territory. In fact, the 2001 statute does not even contain 
the term "island of unincorporated territory." The relevant section reads as 
follows: 
10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection. 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which 
the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would 
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. 
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all 
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on: 
(a) the city or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
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(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; 
(h) other municipal services; and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and varied-
shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the 
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be 
disconnected, 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503 (2001)(emphasis added). Addendum at 1. 
The criteria for determining whether or not to grant a disconnection petition 
under the 2001 statute are contained in Section 10-2-503(1), Addendum at 1. 
Specifically, the court is mandated to determine "whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, 
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase 
over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically 
unreasonable to administer as a municipality.55 Subsection 10-2-503(2) 
(Addendum at 1) indicates that the court must consider all of the listed criteria as 
well as any other relevant evidence in making the determination of the previously 
stated factors. Once the court determines whether or not the disconnection is 
-11-
viable and not overly burdensome, section 10-2-505(4) (Addendum at 3) requires 
that "the court shall order disconnection."1 
The reference to islands and peninsulas in this section is wholly 
distinguishable from the reference in the 2003 amendments. First, the 2001 statute 
does not refer to "unincorporated islands," but rather refers to islands that are 
wholly "within" the boundaries of the municipality or peninsulas that project into 
the "boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." 
Further, the 2001 statute does not indicate that the existence of islands is 
dispositive in the disconnection hearing. It is simply one of the factors to be 
"considered." 
Unincorporated Islands are not Prohibited 
The two definitions of "island" in the two versions of the disconnection 
statutes are very different. The "islands" referred to in the 2001 statute are islands 
which "result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which 
the territory is to be disconnected." Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001); 
Addendum at 1. This language clearly identifies the "islands" in question as 
pockets of unincorporated territory entirely surrounded by the municipality from 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505(4) (2001). Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' 
report, the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria 
in Section 10-2-503. 
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which disconnection is requested. Id. This is distinguishable from the 2003 
definition of "islands of unincorporated territory" where an "island" is defined as 
unincorporated territory that is completely surrounded by incorporated territory 
without reference to which city or cities lie on the borders of the "island." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (2003); Addendum at 4. 
This subtle, but clear, distinction in the definition of island is particularly 
important given the facts of this case. The parcel in question lies on the boundary 
of Pleasant Grove and Cedar Hills. If disconnection were granted, there could 
temporarily be an area of unincorporated land in between these two municipalities. 
Under the definition in the 2003 statute, the island of unincorporated 
territory would result in the mandatory denial of the disconnection petition. 
However, under the definition in the 2001 statute, no island is created because the 
unincorporated territory would be adjacent to Cedar Hills, not "within" the 
boundaries of Cedar Hills. A peninsula would not be created in this case because 
the property in question does not awkwardly jut into either city. 
Plain Meaning of "Considerf> 
Even if an island were to be created under the 2001 statute, section 10-2-
503(2) requires only that the court "consider" all relevant evidence in a 
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disconnection matter including the island issue. The term "consider" is commonly 
held to mean "to think about before arriving at a judgment or decision."2 
Therefore, this section simply requires that the court "think about" the issue 
of islands and peninsulas created by disconnection, but contains no mandate that 
the court deny a petition for disconnection simply because it creates an island. The 
section provides no specific guidelines for the court with respect to the enumerated 
factors other than a requirement that the court "consider" them in making its 
determination. 
Under the plain language of this statute, even if an island is created, the 
"court shall order disconnection" (Utah Code Ann. §10-2-505(4) (2001)) if the 
factors as a whole do not "leave the municipality with a residual area within its 
boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services 
would materially increase over previous years or for which it would become 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-2-503(1) (2001), Addendum at 1. 
Where the statute is plain in its requirement that the court simply consider a 
factor as part of its decision-making process, it is inappropriate and erroneous for 
2
 "Consider" - Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2008. 
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the court to impute from the language that the legislature intended such a factor to 
be dispositive. 
C. The 2001 and 2003 Disconnection Statutes are Substantively 
Different and Distinguishable 
The district court identified the issue of whether or not an island of 
unincorporated territory would be created by the disconnection as the dispositive 
issue in this case. As stated above, the two versions of the disconnection statute 
are completely distinguishable with respect to this issue both in the definition of an 
island and the weight that the court should assign to this factor. In the 2003 
statute, the creation of any unincorporated island is a complete bar to 
disconnection. The court has no discretion in the matter. Under the 2001 statute, 
only unincorporated islands that are wholly within the boundary of the city are 
considered to be a factor, and even then, the existence of the island is not 
dispositive. The court has discretion to grant the petition based on the totality of 
the evidence. 
Essentially, the 2003 amendments re-defined an island of unincorporated 
territory and moved the issue of islands and peninsulas from the list of items to be 
considered (in 2001) as part of the fairness determination to the list of mandatory 
criteria that must be met before a disconnection is valid (in 2003). 
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The court ignored the plain language of the statutes with respect to this issue 
and erroneously ruled them to be substantively identical. As such, the court denied 
the Harveys the opportunity to present evidence of the viability of the 
disconnection and whether the interests of justice and equity would be served by 
disconnection. 
II. THE 2001 DISCONNECTION STATUTE IS THE 
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY STANDARD IN 
THIS MATTER 
In an effort to get a very "quick, clear summary judgment," the district court 
ruled that there was no need to determine whether the 2003 amendments should be 
applied retroactively because both statutes were identical with respect to the 
dispositive issue. Oral Argument Transcript 26:16-18. R. at 1122; Addendum at 
54. However, this determination is essential because if the court determines that the 
substantive requirements of the 2001 statute are the appropriate standard, the 
Harveys1 disconnection is not prohibited by the creation of an unincorporated 
island. The Harveys deserve the right to be allowed their day in court to present 
evidence in support of their disconnection petition. 
A. The General Rule is that Statutory Amendments will not be 
Applied Retroactively 
Utah Code provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared/1 Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Addendum at 5. 
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Consequently, legislation is not given retroactive effect especially with regards to 
substantive changes in legislation. See e.g. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co.,104 P.3d 1185 (2004) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204,208(1988)). 
Utah courts follow the general rule that "a statute generally cannot be given 
retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the 
statute." Washington Nat7 Ins. Co. v. SheiwoodAssocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986)); see also Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 
953 (Utah 1987); In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Legislature did not expressly indicate its intent that these 
provisions be applied retroactively. Neither did the legislature intend the changes 
to be exclusively procedural. To the contrary, the legislature clearly intended the 
changes in the disconnection statute to be substantive in nature. The 2003 
amendments to the disconnection statute were presented before the Utah legislature 
as House Bill No. 98 of the 2003 General Session. The introduction to H.B. 98 
specifically states: "The act modifies the criteria for disconnection and modifies 
the procedure for disconnection." (Emphasis added.) See "H.B 98" 2003 General 
Session of the Utah State Legislature. Addendum at 6. 
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B. The Harveys' Substantive Rights will be Affected if the 2003 
Amendments to the Disconnection Statute are Applied 
Retroactively 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously found that amendments that alter 
the substantive law governing disconnection by creating new factors the district 
court must consider in making its decision should not be applied retroactively. In 
Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 
1983). 
The 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute create several new 
criteria that the court must evaluate in making its decision. This brief has 
addressed at length the significant substantive differences between the 2001 and 
2003 disconnection statutes with respect to the treatment of unincorporated islands 
and peninsulas. However, this is not the only substantive difference between the 
two statutes. 
The 2003 statute adds the burden upon the petitioner to prove that the 
disconnection will not: 
[Ljeave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the 
cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services 
would materially increase over previous years, make it economically or 
practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a 
municipality, or leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003); Addendum at 4. 
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Additionally, the 2001 version of the statute also mandates that the court 
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in 
section 10-2-503. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505(4) (2001), Addendum at 3. This 
mandatory language contained in the 2001 statute places the emphasis for the 
court's decision on the specific statutory criteria of the viability of the 
disconnection and the relative burden that would result from disconnection rather 
than focusing on issues that are only tangentially related to the disconnection 
matter through the vague terms "justice and equity." 
The application of these statutory changes will certainly affect the 
substantive rights of the Harveys. As indicated above, the retroactive application 
of the 2003 amendments would deny the Harveys any opportunity to present 
evidence in this matter because their disconnection petition would be dismissed 
due to the creation of an island of unincorporated territory. The burden placed on 
the Harveys at trial would also be greater. Indeed, the Harveys will be in far less 
favorable circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the decision of the district 
court that granted summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills. The matter 
should be remanded to the district court with instructions to hear evidence and 
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make a final determination based upon the substantive criteria outlined in the 2001 
disconnection statute. 
Dated this 6 day of January 2009. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C 
Gordon Duval 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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10-2-503 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
The issue of 'justice and equity" is largely 
based on fact as found by trial court whose 
rulings should not be disturbed unless it is 
made to appear clearly erroneous In re Layton 
City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P2d 948 (1972) 
Decree disconnecting an 80 acre tract from 
city was consistent with "justice and equity" 
where (1) the 80 acre tract was half of parcel 
and other half was outside city boundary (2) 
the topography of the parcel made it desirable 
to develop the entire 160 acres as one t iact , (3) 
the tract withm the city was without streets, 
improvements, or buildings, (4) the city was 
providing the tract with no municipal services, 
and (5) disconnection of the tract would cause 
neither an impairment of municipal functions 
nor a substantial loss of tax revenue to the city 
In re Layton City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P2d 948 
(1972) 
The determination of what constitutes "jus 
tice and equity" turns on the facts of each 
individual case, and district courts findings 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless cleady 
erroneous In re Disconnection of Certain Ter-
ritory, 668 P2d 544 (Utah 1983) 
Te rms of severance. 
The matter of the adjustmem of the terms 
upon which the territory shall be severed from 
the town or city is a matter tha t must be 
brought to the attention of the commissioners, 
and not to the court before their appomtme it 
In re Fullmei, 33 Utah 43, 92 P 768 (1908) 
(decided under former section, authorizing 
commissioners to adjust terms) 
Validity of petition. 
Petition to disconnect, defective because it 
was not signed by a majority of registered 
voters (before 1993 amendment of this sectisn 
substituting pioperty owners for voters) was 
properly dismissed South Jordan City v Saniy 
City, 870 P 2 d 273 (Utah 1994) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations 
§§ 59 to 61 
10-2-503. Cri ter ia for disconnection. 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a i esidual area within its boundaries for which the 
cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially 
increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or 
practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality 
(2) In making tha t determination, the commissioners shall consider all 
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on 
(a) the city or community as a whole, 
(b) adjoining property owners, 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways, 
(d) water mams and water services, 
(e) sewer mams and sewer services, 
(f) law enforcement, 
(g) zoning, 
(h) other municipal services, and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped 
peninsular land masses result withm or project into the boundaries of the 
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected 
History C. 1953, 10-2-503, enac ted by L 
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1983, ch . 28, § 2, 1996, ch 
132, § 3. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend 
ment effective Apul 29 1996, added the sub 
section designations m Subsection (1) substi 
tuted "The commissioners shall determine' for 
'The court for the purposes oi determining 
whether or not territory should be disconnected 
shall consider' m Subsection (2) substituted 
"In making that determination the commis 
sion" for "The court" m the intioductory lan-
guage, and made stylistic and related changes 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS prejudiced by disconnection other than by the 
loss of property taxes; disconnection would not 
Disconnection warranted. ^ create islands or peninsulas which would leave 
Retroactivity oi ±983 amendment.
 t h e d t y w i t h & r e s i d u a | a r e a t h a t w o u l d h a v e 
Disconnection warranted . t h e e f f e c t o f increasing the cost of providing 
Disconnection of an area from the city was services to disproportionately high or unrea-
warranted where the area was wholly agricul- sonable levels; and there was ample room for 
tural in nature; the city did not have a munici- growth and development of the city without the 
pal sewer system and it was not likely tha t it area. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 
would acquire one; there was no municipal 646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982). 
water system within the city and no negotia-
tions for the purchase of a water system had R e t r o a c t i v i t y of 198S a m e n d m e n t , 
occurred; there had been no municipal improve- The 1983 amendment to this section, adding 
ments within the area; the city had provided the requirement of consideration of the commu-
minimal police and fire protection; there was an nity as a whole and adjoining owners, alters the 
absence of common social, economic, and geo- substantive law and does not have retroactive 
graphic interests between the area and the cit}r; application. In re Disconnection of Certain Ter-
there was no evidence tha t the city would he ritory, 666 R2d 544 (Utah 19S3). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 59 to 61. 
10-2-504, CoimoiMSsicmeFS* h e a r i n g amd r e p o r t , 
(1) Within 30 calendar days of their appointment, the commissioners shall 
hold a public hearing. 
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the commissioners 
shall notify the parties and the public of the public hearing l\y publishing a 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or if there 
is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places 
within the municipality. 
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents 
regarding the disconnection proposal. 
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the commissioners shall report 
to the court their findings and reasons regarding: 
(a.) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503; 
(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected 
that have accrued during the time in which the territory was par t of the 
municipality; and 
(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality -and the territory to 
be disconnected. 
History: C. IS'52, IO-S-504. em ac t ed by L. ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the 
1^77, ch. 48v § 2; 1996, ch . IS2, § 4. section. 
Amendment No tes . — The 1996 amend-
10-2-505o Court actionu 
(1) Upon receiving the commissioners'report, the court may; upon request of 
a
 Party or upon its own motion,, conduct a court hearing. 
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(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence presented by petitioners 
and the municipality regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove the viability of the 
disconnection and that justice and equity require that the territory be 
disconnected from the municipality by a preponderance of the evidence 
(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court 
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria m 
Section 10-2-503 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in 
writing with findings and reasons 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 10-2-505, e n a c t e d by L. ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the 
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 5. section 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1996 amend-
10-2-506. Taxes to meet municipal obligations. 
(1) If the court orders a disconnection of territory from a municipality, the 
court shall also order the county legislative body to levy taxes on the property 
within the disconnected territory that may be required to pay the territory's 
proportionate share of the municipal obligations accrued while the territory 
was part of the municipality 
(2) Any tax levy ordered by the court under Subsection (1) shall be collected 
by the county treasurer in the same manner as though the disconnected 
territory were a municipality 
(3) The county treasurer shall pay to those entities named by the court the 
revenue received from that tax levy 
History: C. 1953, 10-2-506, enacted by L. the court orders a disconnection of territory 
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1993, ch. 227, § 30; 1996, from a municipality" and "accrued while the 
ch. 132, § 6. territory was part of the municipality," m Sub 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend- section (2) inserted "under Subsection (1)", and 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added the sub made stylistic and related changes 
section designations, in Subsection (1) added "If 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
P a y m e n t of bonded indebtedness . m favor of severance without imposition of 
Former section vested m the court the power terms, and where the indebtedness for the 
to impose taxes to be levied on the detached water and sewer system was incurred after 
territory m propei cases, but it did not impose filing of petition for withdrawal and the sewer 
an obligation to pay any portion of town's system was not available to petitioner, and the 
bended indebtedness as a condition to with- water system did not benefit the petitioner In 
diawal, at least where the commission decided re Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P2d 1195 (1937) 
10-2-507, Decree — Filing of documents — Notice require-
ments . 
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy 
of the order and a transparent reproducible copy of the map or plat in the 
county recorder's office 
(2) Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection order, the munici-
pality shall file amended articles of incorporation m the lieutenant governor's 
and county recorder's offices 
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10-2-502.7. Court action. 
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the 
court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the disconnection 
proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
(a) the viability of the disconnection; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality; 
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, 
or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over previous 
years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function 
as a municipality; or 
Si (iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a 
cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing 
municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer 
provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to 
Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of 
the proposed disconnection on: - ~ — -
(a) the municipality or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; and 
(h) other municipal services. 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with 
findings and reasons. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 10 02 050207.ZIP 2,707 Bytes 
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68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
No Change Since 1953 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 68_03_000300.ZIP 1,460 Bytes 
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MUNICIPAL DISCONNECTION AMENDMENTS 
2003 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: Ann W. Hardy 
This act modifies the Utah Municipal Code and the procedure for disconnecting territory 
from a municipality. The act repeals provisions relating to the appointment of 
commissioners to make findings regarding the viability of disconnection. The act 
modifiesMthejcriteria for disconnection and modifies the procedure for disconnection. The 
act also makes technical changes. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
10-2-501, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996 
10-2-507, as last amended by Chapter 318, Laws of Utah 2000 
10-2-508, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996 
RENUMBERS AND AMENDS: 
10-2-502.5, (Renumbered from 10-2-504, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of 
Utah 1996) 
10-2-502.7, (Renumbered from 10-2-505, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of 
Utah 1996) 
REPEALS: 
10-2-502, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996 
10-2-503, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 10-2-501 is amended to read: 
10-2-501. Municipal disconnection — Definitions — Request for disconnection — 
Requirements upon filing request. 
(1) As used in this part[: (a) "County" means the county containing the municipality 
from which territory is proposed to be disconnected, (b) "Municipality" means the 
municipality1 containing the territory proposed for disconnection, (c) "Petitioners"] 
0000006 
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"petitioners" means persons [owning] who: 
(a) own title to real property within the [territory within a municipality1 who propose] 
area proposed for disconnection; and 
fb) have signed a request for disconnection proposing to disconnect that [territory] area 
from [a] the municipality. 
[(d) "Territory" means that property7 within a municipality that is proposed for 
disconnection.] 
(2) {a} Petitioners proposing to disconnect [any territory] an area within and lying on the 
borders of [any incorporated] a municipality shall file with that municipality's legislative body a 
["Request for Disconnection." The Request for Disconnection] request for disconnection. 
(b) Each request for disconnection shall: 
[fa)] ID contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of 
the real property [owners] in the [territory] area proposed for disconnection; 
[ffer)] (ii) give the reasons for the proposed disconnection; 
[(e)] (hi) include a map or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection; and 
[(d)] (iy) designate between one and five persons with authority to act on the petitioners' 
behalf in the proceedings. 
(3) Upon filing the request for disconnection, petitioners shall; 
(a) cause notice of the [petition] request to be published once a week for three 
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality^]; 
[(4) The municipal legislative body may respond to petitioners within 20 calendar days 
after the expiration of the notice period under Subsection (3).] 
[(5) (a) After the 20-day response period, petitioners may file a petition against the 
municipality in district court?] 
[(b) The petition shall include a copy of the Request for Disconnection.] 
(b) cause notice of the request to be mailed to each owner of real property located within 
the area proposed to be disconnected; and 
(c) deliver a copy of the request to the legislative body of the county in which the area 
- 2 -
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proposed for disconnection is located. 
Section 2. Section 10-2-502.5, which is renumbered from Section 10-2-504 is 
renumbered and amended to read: 
[10-2-504]. 1Q-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection — Determination by 
municipal legislative body — Petition in district court. 
(1) Within 30 calendar days [of their appointment] after the last publication of notice 
required under Subsection 10-2-50 U3Y a), the [commissioners] legislative body of the 
municipality in which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall hold a public hearing. 
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the [commissioners] municipal 
legislative body shall [notify the parties and the public] provide notice of the public hearing; 
fa) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county in which the area 
proposed for disconnection is located; and 
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality 
ora if there is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places within the 
municipality. 
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents regarding the 
disconnection proposal. 
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the [commissioners] municipal legislative 
body shall [report to the court their findings and reasons regarding]: 
[(a) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503;] 
[(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected that have accrued 
during the time in which the territory was part of the municipality; and] 
[(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality and the territory to be disconnected.] 
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and 
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an ordinance approving 
disconnection of the area from the municipality. 
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's 
determination under Subsection (4) may be filed in district court by: 
- 3 -
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(i) petitioners; or 
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the request for 
disconnection. 
Section 3. Section 10-2-502.7, which is renumbered from Section 10-2-505 is 
renumbered and amended to read: 
[10-2-505]. 10-2-502.7. Court action. 
(1) [Upon receiving the commissioners1 report] After the filing of a petition under 
Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the court [may] shall, upon request of a party 
or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence [presented by petitioners and the 
municipality] regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
(a) the viability of the disconnection [and]; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality 
[by a preponderance of the evidence.]; 
[(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall order 
disconnection if] 
(c) that the proposed disconnection [satisfies the criteria in Section 10-2-503.] will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost. 
requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over 
previous years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to 
function as a municipality; or 
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in 
a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing 
- 4 -
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municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer 
provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to 
Subsections (3)(c)fi) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of 
the proposed disconnection on: 
(a) the municipality or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; and 
(h) other municipal services. 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with 
findings and reasons. 
Section 4. Section 10-2-507 is amended to read: 
10-2-507. Decree — Filing of documents — Notice requirements. 
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy of the order 
and a transparent reproducible copy of the map or plat in the county recorder's office. 
(2) [Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection order, the] The municipality 
shall file amended articles of incorporation in the lieutenant governor's office, as provided in 
Section 10-1-117, and the county recorder's office[:] within 30 days after, as the case may be: 
(a) adoption of an ordinance approving disconnection under Subsection 
10-2-502.5(4)0)): or 
(b) entry of a court order under Section 10-2-502.7 ordering disconnection. 
(3) The amended articles of incorporation shall: 
(a) describe the postdisconnection geography of the municipality; and 
(b) specify the postdisconnection population of the municipality. 
- 5 -
OOQQQIQ 
H.B. 98 Enrolled Copy 
(4) The lieutenant governor shall comply with the requirements of Subsection 
10-1-117(3). 
[{4)] £5} Any cost incurred by the municipality in complying with this section may be 
charged against the disconnected territory. 
[f5)] £6} The legislative body of each municipality that has had territory disconnected 
shall comply with the notice requirements of Section 10-1-116. 
Section 5. Section 10-2-508 is amended to read: 
10-2-508. Disconnection completed. 
Disconnection is complete when the [municipality files an amendment to its articles of 
incorporation] lieutenant governor certifies the amended articles of incorporation as required by 
Section [10-2-507] 10-1-117. 
Section 6. Repealer. 
This act repeals: 
Section 10-2-502, Court appointment of commissioners. 




Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
IN THE MATTER OF THE < 
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY ; 
FROM THE TOWN OF CEDAR HILLS < 
) PETITION FOR 
) DISCONNECTION 
) Civil No. 
> Judge: 
Petitioners, David and Dixie Harvey, by and through counsel, herewith allege as follows: 
1. Petitioners are .trustees to the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust and owners of the 
David C. and Dixie R. Harvey Limited Liability Company, entities which own the subject 
property within the town of Cedar Hills. The petitioners propose to disconnect that property 
from Cedar Hills. The petitioners are identified in the request for disconnection attached as 
Exhibit A. 
2. Petitioners have designated Dixie Harvey as the person with authority to act on 
their behalf in these proceedings. 
3. Cedar Hills and the territory petitioners propose to disconnect is located in Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
4. The territory that is proposed for disconnection is more specifically described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Quarter Corner common to Sections 6 & 7 of Township 5 
South, Range 2 East, S.L.B.M.; and running thence North 18.13 feet; thence 
North 89°20f East 641.32 feet; thence South 0°20f East 1305.42 feet; thence 
South 89°18' West 599.91 feet; thence North 0°29' West 771.55 feet; thence 
North 75°06' West 39.05 feet; thence North 0°33' West 505.48 feet to the point of 
beginning. Containing an area of 18.74 acres. 
Also: Commencing at a point which is North 89°03' East along the Section line 
690.87 feet and North 14.71 feet (North 26.03 feet & East 690.77 feet) from the 
Quarter Corner common to Sections 6 & 7, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, 
SX.B. M.; and running thence North 89°20' East 676.43 feet; thence South 89°58' 
East 302.52 feet; thence South 0°38 East 816.72 feet; thence South 0°37' West 
496.28 feet; thence South 89°36' West 822.81 feet; ttence North 0°14' West 7.50 
feet; thence South 89°18' West 152.23 feet; thence North 0°20' West 1305.40 feet 
to the point of beginning. Containing an area of 29.79 acres. 
Less the right-of-way of Provo Reservoir Canal as at present located across the 
two tracts above described. Together with 45 shares Pleasant Grove Irrigation 
Company Primary Water and 10 shares of Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company 
East Meadow Water. Utah County, State of Utah. 
5. On June 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the Cedar Hills City Council the Request 
for Disconnection which contained; 
a. the names and signatures of more than 50% of the real property owners in 
the territory proposed for disconnection; 
b. reasons for the proposed disconnection; 
c. a map of the territory proposed for disconnection; and 
d. a statement designating Dixie as a person with authority to act on behalf of 
the other petitioners. 
6. Petitioners caused notice of the petition to be published once a week for three 
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality. An Affidavit of 
Publication is attached as Exhibit B. 
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7. Twenty days have passed since the petitioners filed the request for disconnection. 
WHEREFORE, having complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501(2) 
(1996), petitioners petition the court to: 
1. appoint three disinterested persons as commissioners to make findings regarding 
the viability of the disconnection proposal in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502 to 504 
(1996); 
2. after receiving the commissioners' report, conduct a court hearing in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505 (1996); and 
3. order disconnection of the territory from Cedar Hills. 
DATED this 7 day of August 2001. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITH & MORLEY, P.C. 
J&C?nJl*ry^ WCC^CA 7 
Gordon Duval 
Attorney for Petitioners 
H \CLIENTS\Gordon's Clients\Harvey, DixieVenfied petition for order of disconnection wpd 
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REQUEST FOR DISCONNECTION 
As trustees for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust and as owners of the David C. and 
Dixie R. Harvey Limited Liability Company, which combined owns the real property described 
on the attached plat and as the owners of 100% of the value of the property lying partially within 
the boundary of Cedar Hills, Utah, we ask to have the property disconnected from Cedar Hills, 
Utah, in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-501. 
We request this disconnection because Cedar Hills has proved unwilling to work with us 
in our attempts to use the property according to our rights as property owners. While we were 
out of the state on a religious assignment from 1994 to 1997, Cedar Hills annexed and designated 
our property as the future location of a city park and zoned the property public facility. This was 
essentially a taking of our property as it rendered our property useless for any type of residential 
use. Since our return in 1997. we have repeatedly attempted to remedy the situation b\ meeting 
with city planners and attending various meetings with city officials. We indicated our 
willingness to sell a nine acre portion of our property to the city for a city park in exchange for 
residential zoning of the remaining 15 acres, but the city refused our offer. As such, the property 
is still zoned public facility. We have never received any compensation from the city for the 
beneficial use of our property that we have been denied because of the public facility zoning. 
The city has failed to reach any reasonable solution and refuses to rezone the property. 
Consequently, we request that the property be disconnected from Cedar Hills. 
Furthermore, a disconnection would enable us to reunite all of our property under a single 
city government. The property was separated when Cedar Hills annexed part of it and left the 
remainder in Pleasant Grove. The two properties are plats 36 and 40 as depicted on Utah County 
Plat NE section 7, township 5 south, range 2 east. The northern portion of each of these plats lies 
within the borders of Cedar Hills, and the southern portion of each of these plats lies within the 
borders of Pleasant Grove. By approving the proposed disconnection, the plats will be united as 
they once were under a single city government and taxing unit. 
We hereby designate Dixie and David Harvey of 2806 North 1450 West, Cedar Hills, 
Utah, and Gordon Duval of DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY as the individuals with 
authority to act on our behalf in this request for disconnection proceeding. 
Dated this ]J^> of June 2001. 
Dixie Harvey / 
Trustee for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust 
Member of David R. and Dixie R. Harvey L.L.P. 
* 
David Harvey 
Trustee for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust 
Member of David R. and Dixie R. Harvey L.L.P. 
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PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
from 
The Daily Herald 
STATE OF UTAH 
Utah County 
1 SS ' 
NOTICE 
NOTICE is hereby given that the owners of the approxi-
mate area of 9200 North Utah County Road, (parcels 
36 and 40 as depicted on Utah County Plat NE section 
7, township 5 south, range 2 east), are requesting dis-
connection from the town of Cedar Hills The property 
consists of approximately 25 acres. 
Copies of the proposed Request for Disconnection are 
filed in the Cedar Hills City Office, 44393 West Cedar 
Hills Dnve, Cedar Hills, Utah. 
Published in The Daily Herald July 2, 9, and 16, 2001 
Legal Notice #506132 Published in The Daily Herald 
July 2, 9, 16, 2001. 
I, Konnie Lynn Davis, being first duly 
sworn depose and say that I am the 
Legal Billing Clerk of the Daily 
Herald, a newspaper of general 
circulation, published seven times each 
week at Provo, Utah, County of Utah; 
that: the notice attached hereto, 
#506132 Notice is hereby given, and 
which is a copy, was published in said 
newspaper , the first publication 
having been made on the 2nd day of 
July, 2001, and the last on the 16th 
day of July, 2 001; that said notice was 
published in the regular and entire 
issue of every number of the paper 
during the period and times of 
publication, and the same was published 
in the newspaper proper and^ jopt in the 
supplement. 
Subscribed and sworn before me 
this 18th day of July, 2001 
cz^Jt Notary7 Public 
Residence: Eagle Mountain, Utah 
My commission expires February 5, 2 005 
r 
L 
.LISA DANETTE STONc | wrwpi/Buc-sTAWofm 
fij 1555 N. FREEDOM BLVD 
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/ /— v 
Gordon Duval, Bar No 6532 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C 
947 South 500 East, Suite 200 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone (801) 763-0155 
Facsimile (801) 763-8379 
Attorney for Harvey's 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J25Noith J 00 West Piovo Utah 8460J 
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID C. HARVEY, et al. 
Defendants, 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY 
FROM THE CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
DA WD and DIXIE HARVEY, individually 
and as trustees, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DETERMINE 
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY 
STANDARD 
faijp Nos 01-040404*? 
01-0403694 
01-0404044 
Judge James Taylor 
David and Dixie Harvey respectfully move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that the Court enter an order of Partial Summary Judgement indicating that the 
?C01 ' £ * ? f l ,'V i 
0000021 
2001 Municipal Disconnection statute (§ 10-2-501 et seq. (2001)) is the applicable law in this 
case. This motion is based upon the following: 
1. This disconnection action was commenced in 2001. 
2. The law governing municipal disconnections at the date this action was commenced was 
3. In 2003, the Utah Legislature enacted amendments to the disconnection statute which 
changed the substantive rights of the parties involved in a disconnection action. 
4. Because the disconnection statutes are substantive in nature, the applicable statute is the 
one in effect at the time the disconnection is filed. 
5. Utah Code section 68-3-3 states that "no part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so stated." Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-3 (2004). 
6. The 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute are not expressly retroactive. 
Respectfully submitted, this "^® day of September, 2007. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
GORDON/ftUVAL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
947 South 500 East, Suite 200 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone (801) 763-0155 
Facsimile (801) 763-8379 
Attorney for Harveys 
r
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North J 00 West, Provo, Utah S4601 
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID C. HARVEY, er. al. 
Defendants, 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY 
FROM THE CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
DAVID and DIXIE HARVEY, individually 
and as trustees, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS, 
Defendants. 
HARVEYS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR CROSS-MOTION 




Judge James Taylor 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Harveys respectfully 
submit this reply memorandum m support of their cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
It appears from the City of Cedar Hills' Memorandum in Opposition to the Harveys' 
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment that the parties are in agreement with respect to many of 
the factors at issue before the court in this discomiection matter. Specifically, the parties agree 
that; (a) the Harveys have the right to proceed with their disconnection; (b) the applicable 
statutory standard for the disconnection matter is the 2001 version of the disconnection siatute; 
and (c) the evidence allowed at the disconnection hearing should be limited to those criteria 
specifically addressed in the disconnection statute. 
A. The Disconnection Action May Proceed 
The Harveys acknowledge that this court has already ruled that their disconnection 
action may proceed. (Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2007). As such, the Harveys 
withdraw their request that the court affirmatively rule that the facts stated in the motion 
constitute "changed and unusual circumstances." 
B. Applicable Statutory Standard is the 2001 Statute 
In 2001, the Harveys filed their disconnection petition with this court. The statute in 
effect at the time the petition was filed called upon the court to appoint impartial 
commissioners to hold a public hearing, make findings and prepare a report based on those 
findings. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-502, 503, 504 (2001). This code section also contained 
very specific criteria for disconnection, as follows: 
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will leave the 
municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, 
or other burdens of municipal sendees would materially increase over previous years or 
-' u Li 0 u 
for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a 
municipality. 
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shah consider all relevant factors 
including the effect of the disconnection on: 
(a) the city or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water sendees; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer sendees; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; 
(h) other municipal services; and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and varied-shaped peninsular land 
masses result within the project in to the boundaries of the municipality from which 
the territory is to be disconnected. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). 
The 2001 version of the statute also mandates that the court shall order disconnection if 
the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in section 10-2-503. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-
505(4) (2001). 
In 2003, the state legislature repealed sections 10-2-502 and 10-2-503 of the Utah Code 
and amended the disconnection statute. These amendments eliminated the impartial 
commissioners from the disconnection process. The amended section provided for the local 
legislative body to preside over the public hearing process. Id. at § 10-2-502.5. Most 
significantly, the amended statute makes additions to and modifies the criteria in hearings for 
disconnection. Id. at § 10-2-502.7. For example, section 10-2-502.7(d) requires the petitioner 
to prove that the county will be capable of providing sendees that will no longer be provided by 
the city. This subsection adds a completely new factor that the petitioner must prove. 
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Generally, legislation is not given retroactive effect. Utah Code section 68-3-3 
codifies this principle, stating that "no part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so stated." UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 68-3-3 (2004). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that, "as a general rule, 'retroactivity is not favored in the law.'" Goebel v. Salt Lake 
dry S. R.R. Co. ,104 P.3d 1185 (2004) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204,208(1988)). 
The Utah Supreme Coun has ruled that where statutory amendments governing 
disconnection create new factors the district court must consider in making its decision, that 
such amendments alter the substantive law. In Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from 
Highland, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 1983.) Because the disconnection statutes are 
substantive in nature, the applicable statute is the one in effect at the time the disconnection is 
filed. 
Based upon the fact that the City of Cedar Hills has cited to the 2001 version of the 
disconnection statute throughout their memorandum, the parties appear to be in agreement that 
the 2001 statute is applicable in this case. As such, the Harveys have prepared a motion on this 
matter which is being filed concurrently with this reply. 
C. Evidence Relating to the Annexation Process Should be Limited 
The City of Cedar Hills spends considerable effort in their memorandum in 
opposition to this motion to persuade the court to limit the scope of the evidence presented at 
the disconnection hearing. The City argues that the Coun is not required, or even permitted, to 
-4-
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consider any evidence relating to the annexation, but rather the Court must limit its inquiry to 
the specific criteria set forth in the statute. The Harveys do not dispute this argument. 
The 2001 version of the disconnection statute sets forth specific factors to be considered 
b3r the commissioners and the court in determining the viability and appropriateness of 
disconnection. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). Ultimately, the decision of the court 
must rest solely upon these factors as mandated by the language of section 10-2-505(4) which 
states that the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the cnteria 
in section 10-2-503. 
In the present case, there has been much discussion about the procedural defects in the 
annexation process as well as agreements that were supposedly entered into at the time of 
annexation or as a condition of annexation. For purposes of the disconnection matter, none of 
this evidence is relevant. The evidence and arguments should be restricted to the present status 
of the property and the city. Any past transactions between the parties are irrelevant to the 
determination of the viability of the disconnection. Specifically, the City of Cedar Hills should 
not be permitted to present evidence or argue that the Harvey property was designated as park 
land as part of a larger annexation and zoning agreement. The Harveys should not be pemiittcd 
to present evidence of procedural defects in the annexation. 





This Court has previously determined that the Harveys' disconnection action may 
proceed. (Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2007). With respect to the remaining issues 
addressed by the parties on this motion, the parties appear to be in agreement on the issues of 
the applicable statutory standard and the limitation of evidence related to the annexation 
process. The Harveys have submitted motions related to these issues concurrently with this 
reply memorandum for the Court's consideration. 
DATED this j 2p day of September, 2007. 
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JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on April 4, 2008. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
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(April 4, 2008) 
THE JUDGE: This is Harvey versus Cedar Hills. 
THE CLERK: It's in there. 
THE JUDGE: It's in there. It's in the— 
THE CLERK: It's down on the bottom shelf. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
All right. I, I've reviewed the pleadings, I know 
where we are. So who wants to be heard? 
MR. DUVAL: I'll be heard in the matter. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. DUVAL 
MR. DUVAL: Three motions pending, Your Honor. 
Maybe I can address the statutory one because I believe that 
explains why the other motions may or may not be necessary. 
We believe that the, as you may remember this case 
was filed in 2001 under a certain set of procedural rules. 
Legislation was changed in 2003 with a new, a few framework 
in place. As a matter of fact it was the new House Bill a, 
98 specifically says in its heading it modifies the criteria 
for disconnect. I have a copy— 
THE JUDGE: Yes. This whole case is like quantum 
physics because everybody, everything keeps moving. They're 




























MR. DUVAL: Yes. And if I may just provide a copy 
to the court— 
Yes. 
— of that rule. 







This is the one that was passed in 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUVAL: And it clearly says in the heading 
that it modifies the criteria for disconnection, which I 
believe is substantive, which means that it should, that it 
wouldn't apply to the case. To the extent it modifies the 
procedure for disconnection we cited, both sides have cited 
to the court the cases that say the procedure can be 
modified. But as you look through this the changes are 
actually intense. Especially as it relates to criteria. 
As a matter of fact, as I reviewed it it seems like the 2001 
and the 2003 statutes are a, due, turn on the head the 
criteria that are to be applied. 
I have copies of the 2001 statute. May I approach 
with that, Your Honor, just so you can see that? 
If I can just explain. The 2001 statute lists at 
section 503 the criteria for disconnection, that's two 




























the disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual 
area within its boundaries which essentially makes it 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer. And 
the second sets forth the criteria, subsection (2). 
And then if you go over to the next page section 
505 which talks about the court action, and that's where 
we're involved now, then you see I underlined there 
subsection (4) where it says, after considering the evidence 
and the commissioners and the court, the court shall order 
disconnection if the proposed connection satisfies the 
criteria in that section. So it really enthrones that 
criteria. It really says, Judge, this is where you're, 
you're supposed to look at these criteria, and if you find 
he's satisfied these criteria then you shall order 
disconnection. 
And then if I may approach with the 2003 statute 
how it modifies that significantly. 
The 2003 statute now has the criteria in section 
502.7. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUVAL: And it's subsect ion (4) is where those 
criteria are listed. But look how it's done that. In the 
heading of subsection (4) it says, 
In determining whether petitioners have 




























Two of them. Then you consider those relevant 
factors. And so it almost makes it like they're, they're 
just, oh, by the way these are things you're suppose to 
consider, these are some of the things to consider in the 
other two— 
THE JUDGE: Well, it says the court shall 
consider. I don't think it's an oh, by the way deal, is 
it? 
MR. DUVAL: No. But it highlights in essence the 
other two criteria which are stated above. So I think it 
changes the criteria how you proceed. And I think it 
impacts how we present our case. 
THE JUDGE: Well, these seven are the same. 
MR. DUVAL: The seven, no, the seven are the same, 
yes— 
THE JUDGE: (a) through (h). 
MR. DUVAL: (a) through (h), correct, yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And the other... And I then I 
consider whether they have met their burden of proof. 
MR. DUVAL: Right. But, but the difference is in 
the 2001 statute you have a, the, the number of subsection 
(1) which is also a criteria. That's the standard there, 
another a standard that has to be considered as well. 




























here. The 2001 version. 
MR. DUVAL: 503. 
THE JUDGE: 503 has subsection (1) which talks 
about what the commissioners decide. 
MR. DUVAL: Right, right. 
THE JUDGE: And it seems to me that that would 
correspond to subsection (3), (3) isn't it, of 502.7 in the 
new act? 
MR. DUVAL: But you see it's rewritten entirely 
and it— 
THE JUDGE: It is. 
MR. DUVAL: — and it changes. And so that's why 
to avoid all that confusion— 
THE JUDGE: Well, and what I'm trying to focus on 
is what has changed. 
MR. DUVAL: It changes, it changes talking about 
the viability, it changes talking about whether or not the 
municipality will leave, will have an area within its 
boundaries for which the cost requirements a, or other burden 
of providing municipal services would— 
THE JUDGE: Well, sub (ii), subsection (c)(ii) is 
the same, and (c)(iii) I think is probably the same. Maybe 
not. That's consistent with case law though. You know, 
(i), (ii), and (iii) all appear to be kind of a restatement 




























MR. DUVAL: They're similar, Your Honor. But 
that's the point is the fact that we have to compare. We 
just think to get into hearing we should apply the law that 
was in effect at the time the disconnection was filed. We 
believe that 2001 statute i s — 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. DUVAL: — is the relevant one. 
THE JUDGE: You say '01 applies because the '03 
statute was applied after the case was filed. 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: Because these changes in your view are 
substantive, not procedural. 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. It changes how you're 
supposed to analyze them and, and consider the various 
evidence that's presented. It impacts how we present the 
case, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Well, it's important for me to know 
then how are they materially different. Let's focus on 
that. If there really isn't a difference, if it really is 
just a restatement of the rule then it doesn't matter. 
MR. DUVAL: It probably it is a restatement, 
Your Honor, because I believe it changes— 
THE JUDGE: How is it different? 
MR. DUVAL: — it changes, you'll see here now 
that justice in eguity is one of the, is before it was like 
























a, it's not even mentioned as a criteria. 
THE JUDGE: It didn't do justice or equity 
before? 
MR. DUVAL: It was not, not a criteria. It was 
just, it was— 
THE JUDGE: That's what courts do. 
MR. DUVAL: Right. I understand that, 
Your Honor. But, but I believe it's necessary because it 
relates to the next question about what evidence is going to 
be admitted and when and how that would be, come before the 
court. Justice in equity is not considered in section 2001 
as part of the criteria, it's not identified. 
THE JUDGE: It's a characterization of the 
process. It's not... How could I, how could I do anything 
if I'm not doing justice or doing equity. I don't understand 
the substantive difference between these two sections on this 
area, counsel. You really need to explain to me. I'm not 
seeing, I'm not seeing that the substantive law has 
changed. Clearly the procedure is different. But that's 
not the question before us. A change of procedure we follow 
the procedure. 
MR. DUVAL: Subsection (3)(c)(iii)— 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. DUVAL: — is new. 




























islands or peninsulas of unincorporated 
territory. 
Is that an issue in this case? 
MR. DUVAL: Could be, Your Honor. Yes. 
THE JUDGE: What about a, (2)(i) in the old 
statute? Islands or reasonably large or peninsular land 
masses. Isn't that the same the same thing? 
MR. DUVAL: No. It's not, Your Honor. Because 
you can have those irregular shaped peninsulas. Whether or 
not it's a, whether or not it's unincorporated is a relevant 
factor in this case, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Well, we're not talking about an 
island. Correct? 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: We're talking about a peninsula. And 
the old statute says, 
Unreasonably large or varied shaped 
peninsula land masses. 
That's something to be considered. And the new 
statute says, well, if it creates— 
MR. DUVAL: Can't have that. 
THE JUDGE: Can't have them at all. 
MR. DUVAL: Right. Very very important in this 
case, Your Honor. Because when it's disconnected it will be 




























THE JUDGE: So my recollection this is a property 
that's right on the border. 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. And it's Harveys intention 
to go into Pleasant Grove immediately upon disconnection. 
So that's a substantive— 
THE JUDGE: Isn't there a procedure for cities to 
dispute, I mean, if this were Pleasant Grove against a 
Highland, or, is it Highland? Yes. If the cities wanted to 
change the boundary there's an a separate procedure for doing 
that. Right? 
MR. DUVAL: There's a way to do it agreeably and 
disagreeably. They can do a boundary, boundary annexation 
or change of boundaries by— 
THE JUDGE: There's a procedure— 
MR. DUVAL: — by agreement. 
THE JUDGE: — for the city to battle out— 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: — ownership of territory. 
MR. DUVAL: Correct. So that's why, Your Honor, 
we believe the 2001 statute is the one that it applies. We 
believe there are substantive differences here that impact my 
client's right— 
THE JUDGE: Why shouldn't I require the cities to 



























areas abutting each other, I don't have any county area in 
the middle, no greenbelt, why shouldn't I require that the 
cities battle this out? If Pleasant Grove wants to take this 
property into Pleasant Grove, why shouldn't Pleasant Grove 
petition and take on Highland and have the discussion. Why, 
why should, why should we allow a private landowner to 
essentially create a little area of county and then make that 
election? 
MR. DUVAL: That procedure contemplates that the 
city of Pleasant Grove could have objected to the 
disconnection. That's the reason for public hearing to allow 
all interested parties to have input and say so. But it's a 
right of the property owner, it's not just a right of 
neighboring cities. So there's two, two separate interests 
to be protected there. There's no doubt that Pleasant Grove 
does have an interest in the outcome, but there's also no 
doubt that the Harveys have an interest. And so they can 
pursue that independently. 
THE JUDGE: So the first of your, of the motion 
that you're addressing right now is your argument that the 
new law is a, is a substantive change and therefore I should 
apply the old statute, not the new statute. 
MR. DUVAL: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you want to speak to 
that, counsel? 
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ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, the, the motions that 
are before you I don't have some of the background. If I 
can approach and just hand you a map. 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
MR. JOHNSON: Just to refresh your memory of, of 
what we're looking at. 
THE JUDGE: The thing that sticks out in my memory 
most from this is that the first decision I rendered I blew 
it because I assumed that they were living on the property, 
and I found out they weren't and changed my mind. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Yes. 
THE JUDGE: I don't do that very often, change my 
mind. My wife will tell you. 
MR. JOHNSON: And a, what it is, the parcel that 
is being petitioned to disconnect is this approximate 12, 13 
acres in white. There's— 
THE JUDGE: South of Harvey Boulevard? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. And there's white right next 
to it which a, is, is an elementary school. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: And then the homes around it and 
those two white parcels is what was annexed back in 1997. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 




























south of this. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: And then the David and Dixie 
Harvey actually own this land on the other side of Murdock 
Canal— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: — and a, have been farming that 
for many years. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: And that's over there. This is, is 
now Pleasant Grove city to the east of the subject parcel. 
And so just, I just wanted to have that for you to refresh 
your memory. And, and I'll, I'll turn t o — 
THE JUDGE: Looking... Just one more question and 
it may or may not be relevant. I'm looking at the, at the 
map. And I look at 900 West it says Pleasant Grove, that 
street. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: I see immediately to the east of the 
Harvey property. Now that's Pleasant Grove too— 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, it's kind of shaded. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: What about farther north— 



























THE JUDGE: — across Harvey Boulevard? Is that 
also Pleasant Grove? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. There's quite a checker board 
there, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: And, and this goes to the question 
you were asking Mr. DuVal about the cities— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: — doing a boundary adjustment. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: The respective city councils have 
considered that over the last several years, and they looked 
at it very carefully within the last year. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: And a, which is one of the reasons 
that although this, these are all of the motions of the 
Harveys, Cedar Hills did not push for these to be decided 
sooner because there was perhaps a legislative resolution— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, not perhaps. There was a 
legislative resolution— 
THE JUDGE: Being considered. 
MR. JOHNSON: — being worked out that the two 




THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: — they were, they were saying okay 
let's, let's rework this, let's figure out a better line and 
it will help provide city services better, so forth and so 
on. 
And the outcome of that, Your Honor, was that a, 
that the cities called the public hearing, they invited input 
from the public. And the people in Pleasant Grove said we 
don't want to be in Cedar Hills, and the people in Cedar 
Hills said we don't want to be in Pleasant Grove and so there 
was no line. 
THE JUDGE: Everybody except the Harveys. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's right. That's right. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: And so that's— 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: — so that was looked at and, and 
rejected— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: — based on public feedback. 
THE JUDGE: So we're, we're down to now it's 
these two parcels south of Harvey Boulevard. And when I say 
two— 
MR. JOHNSON: At this point it's just one because 
the, the other is now a school— 



























THE JUDGE: Show me again. The school, the school 
is to the east or the west? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. This white area, let me draw 
an X. This is the parcel in discussion. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: A school has been built right there, 
the Harveys no longer own it. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: When this was originally annexed in 
there was about 25 acres that was zoned public facilities, it 
was Cedar Hills City hope that it would all be a park. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: But approximately 13 of that has 
been built into an elementary school. 
THE JUDGE: All right. So I've, I've highlighted 
in yellow the Harvey property. Is that accurate? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And that's the property, that's the 
property that's in question. Do you agree? 
MR. DUVAL: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. All right. 
Let's go ahead. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Now turning to the, the 
differences between the 2001 and 2003 statutes it's the 




























procedures from the 2003 statute were used to get to this 
point before the court that that's the statute that should 
apply. However, we don't see that it makes a real 
difference. Under the 2001 statute under 10-2-503(2). 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: It says that all relevant factors 
should be looked at including. And then it gives a list. 
That isn't a mutually exclusive list. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: That's just a list that says make 
sure you don't forget these things. There are other things 
that can be looked at that are also relevant factors. Those 
relevant things would be everything that is included in the 
2003 statute. 
THE JUDGE: Well, there was one area that counsel 
pointed out that I think is, is hard to reconcile between the 
two and that the peninsular or peninsula argument, the '03 
version seems to say that the proposed reading, this is 
subsection (c), 501(2).7b, sub (c) says, 
the proposed disconnection will not: 
Then (3). 
Leave or create one more islands or 
peninsulas of unincorporated territory. 
I mean it's not, that isn't something for me to 
think about, it says that I have to find that it will not 
























leave a peninsula. Under the old statute it simply says 
taken as you say, consider among other things whether or not 
there will be a peninsula. That, that seems to be kind of a 
difference. In the one sense it's mandatory if there's a 
peninsula I can't approve it. In the other statute it says I 
can take that into account, but in consideration of all of 
the other factors I may still approve it. That seems to be 
quite a difference. 
MR. JOHNSON: What I'm saying is you're going to 
be looking at the exact same factors. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Well, it's undisputed here that if I 
disconnect this property there's going to be an 
unincorporated area in the middle that's not connected to any 
other unincorporated property. 
MR. JOHNSON: Right. And as I understand what 
you're saying there aren't different factors, it's the same, 
what's relevant— 
THE JUDGE: In the one sense— 
MR. JOHNSON: — is the same, it's, it's you're 
saying— 
THE JUDGE: The weight. 
MR. JOHNSON: — it seems 2003 requires me to put 
a stiffer weight o n — 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I don't have any discretion at 
all it sounds like under the 2003 statute, it says if it 



























leaves an island of unincorporated territory I can't approve 
it. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I believe that other district 
court judges have taken that exact position. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. And that seems to be a, a 
substantial departure from the 503 statute, isn't it? 
MR. JOHNSON: It, it is a change. It's not a 
change in what evidence you will look at. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: But it is a change in the weight you 
would put upon it, yes. 
THE JUDGE: And, and it's critical for this case 
because, I mean there, the facts are undisputed. If I grant 
this, this little yellow spot on this map here right here is 
completely surrounded by incorporated territory, that's an 
island. And a under '03 I've got to say denied. And if I, 
if I follow the, the standard in, in from the '01 statute 
it's something I take into account but it isn't 
determinative. Is that... 
MR. JOHNSON: I would submit that it would be 
reversible error way. 
THE JUDGE: Great. 
MR. JOHNSON: Under either statute. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: I would submit under either statute 
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that it would be reversible error to leave an unincorporated 
island of the county surrounded by municipalities. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, so you think that even if I 
applied the '01 section it doesn't matter. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's right. That's right. 
That, that it would a, you have to consider that factor in 
that the weight that you should give it would be, I think 
we're informed in 2003 substantially the same even under 
the '01 statute and you should arrive at the same 
conclusion. 
THE JUDGE: Is there a case that makes that 
conclusion with regard to, to the unincorporated island? 
MR. JOHNSON: I'm not sure I follow the question. 
THE JUDGE: Well, what I'm saying is the language 
in the '03 act— 
MR. JOHNSON: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: — is very plain, the statutory 
language is very plain, the court shall not approve it if 
there is an island. 
MR. JOHNSON: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: The language in the '01 act or the '01 
statute, in making that determination the commissioners shall 
consider relevant factors including whether islands result. 
That just makes it a relevant factor, that doesn't make it a 
dispositive factor. 



























MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: That's what I'm saying. 
MR. JOHNSON: If I follow what the question is, 
was that tweeking of the statutory language, was that based 
on a case. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Not that I know of. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. But your point, 
what you're telling me, what I hear you saying is that 
because the '01 statute doesn't even talk about going to the 
court. The fact that we're here procedurally in court I 
have to apply the statute that creates the court procedure 
which is the '03 statute. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's the procedure that was 
followed to get us here. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. That's our position. 
THE JUDGE: So I can't, I can't do half of one and 
half of the other. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's awkward. But I submit again, 
Your Honor, I submit that even if you were to move forward 
under the '01 act— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: — that fairness and justice would 



























under the '03 act because you are to consider all relevant 
factors. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. DUVAL 
MR. DUVAL: Just one point, Your Honor. I don't 
think it's completely correct. The 2001 statute if you look 
at subsection 505(2). 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. DUVAL: We're in the same point, the same 
hearing, the same, same examination that occurs, because 
at the hearing the court shall hear evidence presented by 
petitioners and the municipality regarding the viability. 
And so the only difference was whether we had a three member 
panel that heard it earlier or whether we had the city 
council that heard it earlier, we still end up at this court 
to review the, the fact before and to make these 
determinations. 
And so we've used the 2001 and the 2003 statute 
both envision that we're going to be before this court with 
an evidentiary hearing to analyze these issues. It's the 
criteria that we're looking at that has changed and that's 
why we believe that the 2001 statute is appropriate. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON 
MR. JOHNSON: If I may briefly, Your Honor. 


























looked at that get us to this point was the 2003 act, not the 
2001 act. And that, that's why we're saying we need to 
proceed under the same criteria that got us here. That's 
the rule that they applied. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I think I have to apply the rule 
that applies. Not... If they made a mistake and considered 
the wrong statute that's, that's an issue for them. But 
that's neither here nor there. 
Counsel, as I read, I think a plain reading of the 
2001 statute subsection 503(2)(i) I think, I think he's 
right. I don't think that the 2003 statute made a material 
difference. I think it simply made it more explicit what was 
plainly, not plainly, what was intended by the old 503 and 
that is that I think the only way I can read 10-2-503 from 
the 2001 statute is to read that if a disconnect would leave 
an unincorporated island that that is a basis or a reason to 
deny, that that is dispositive. And I think it was 
dispositive then and I think that's dispositive now. So I, 
I don't think there's a material difference between the two 
statutes on that point. 
MR. DUVAL: I don't understand, Your Honor, 
because I don't know that, there's no case law cited to the 
effect, it's just one of the many factors to consider. And 
there are, are numerous situations in this place where there 




























THE JUDGE: Do we have other motions that I need 
to hear on this? Is that dispositive? Does that decide 
the case? 
MR. DUVAL: If the court's ruling is that the 20 01 
statute would not allow an island to be created, then I 
believe that would be dispositive, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's how I see it, that's how I see 
it. Do you want to draw up a ruling to that effect. And a, 
well, I can certify that as final and if you need to take it 
up on appeal you can. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. And so, just to make sure 
I'm following— 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Let me, let me state it again as 
carefully as I can and then you can state it back to me to 
make sure we're understanding. The question that's before 
me today is whether the court should proceed under the 
substantive provisions of the 2001 statute or the 2003 
statute because this case was filed when the 2001 statute 
was in effect and the 2003 statute was enacted thereafter. 
So the question for me is whether the change in the 
law is substantive or procedural. If it is procedural we 
apply the procedure that's in place when I conduct the 
hearing. If it's substantive we apply the law of substance 


























at the time the case is filed, not at the time the case, the 
hearing is conducted. 
I've carefully compared the statute from 2001 and 
the statute from 2003. I'm satisfied that the relevant 
criteria that is whether or not the disconnection will leave 
an island of unincorporated territory, which is plainly 
dispositive under the 2003 statute, was a relevant, first of 
all it was certainly a relevant matter under the 2001 
statute. But I think it's more than that, I think it was 
also dispositive under the 2001 statute. Because I think 
the, the only way I can read 10-2-503(2)(i) of the 2001 
statute is that the court should deny the, the petition to 
disincorporate if it would leave an island of unincorporated 
territory. So I think that while the 2003 statute restates 
the law it doesn't change the law. 
But the problem is that the, the factor which is 
now very plainly in the '03 statute was present in the '01 
statute and, therefore, the city is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on that point. 
If the court of appeals chooses to reverse me they 
reverse me. It's an interesting question. There isn't case 
law directly on point. I think the case law that's available 
implies that the, the policy of the court should be to avoid 
islands of annexation. And it's not stated, it's not under 
503 in the 2001 statute it's not stated in such a way that I 



























may have a discretion to consider that as a part of the 
totality. I think that's a, I think that's written and 
intended (inaudible word) to disincorporation. 
MR. JOHNSON: That is the city's position, 
Your Honor. And a, we, we had not formally filed a 
dispositive motion on that, we were waiting for the ruling 
from the court today. What I'm hearing is that you would be 
prepared to sign— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm there and prepared to sign 
an order. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: We can jump through the hoops and 
prepare a motion. But the facts are not in dispute. 
MR. JOHNSON: No, I don't believe they are. 
THE JUDGE: This property is surrounded by 
incorporated property. That point in law, if I'm wrong E'm 
wrong and we'll consider all of the other factors. But if my 
view is sustained there is no point in taking additional 
evidence and dragging this out father. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I'll prepare an order to that 
effect, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Great. 
MR. DUVAL: Just a quick question, Your Honor. To 
the extent we could expedite that we would like to have a 



























is not taken in the interim. 
MR. JOHNSON: The city would, as you may recall 
there is a companion case for condemnation and the city is 
willing to agree to not move forward on that case until the 
appeal has— 
THE JUDGE: And it certainly is an appealable 
question, and I would absolutely be willing to sign an order 
to that effect because I think it's an interesting question 
that hasn't been addressed. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's also the companion 
claim against the city on the constitutional rights that I'm 
defending the city on. Are we going to leave that on hold 
until we finish the appeal. 
THE JUDGE: Do you want to do that? 
MR. DUVAL: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: I think it makes sense to do that. 
This can go on forever. I'm sorry. I wish we would get it 
resolved quickly for everyone. But let's try to move it 
along expeditiously if we can. Thank you. 
MR. DUVAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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# IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
City of Cedar Hills, : ORDER 
Plaintiff 
: Date: June 2, 2008 
vs. 
: Case Number: 010403694 
David C. Harvey, et. al., 
Defendants : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 4, 2008. The Plaintiff was 
present, represented by Eric Todd Johnson, and the Defendants, David and Dixie Harvey, were 
also present and represented by counsel, Gordon Duval. Also present was David Church, 
representing Cedar Hills in the constitutional rights companion case. The Court ruled from the 
bench for summary judgment m favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection, and counsel 
for Cedar Hills prepared an order. The Harveys filed an objection to the order, which was, m 
substance, a motion to reconsider. After reviewing the proposed order and the objection, the 
Court finds and orders: 
1. The operative facts are undisputed. The real property that is the subject of this 
dispute is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory, either in Cedar Hills or in 
Pleasant Grove. If the Court were to grant the motion for disconnection, the order 
would effectively create an island of unincorporated land. 
2. The parties argued over whether the Court should proceed under the 2001 or 2003 
Page 1 of 4 
000C060 
version of the Disconnection statute. 
3. After carefully comparing both versions of the Disconnection statute, the Court 
finds that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between 
the two versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of 
the Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated 
island, the disconnection should be disallowed. 
4. Because the disconnection sought by the Harveys in this matter would create an 
island of unincorporated territory as prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003 
versions of the Disconnection statute, such disconnection is DENIED, and Cedar 
Hills is GRANTED summary judgment as to the disconnection issue. 
5. Cedar Hills has agreed to stay the companion case for condemnation (which has 
been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number 
010404045) in this matter pending appeal of the disconnection issue. 
Accordingly, the companion claim by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for 
constitutional rights violations (which has been consolidated into the present case 
but which was previously case number 010404044) is also stayed pending appeal 
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6. Summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection is 
certified as final and appealable. 
Dated this 3 day of ^ > i^C , 2008 
Judge Jaines R. Taylor 
Fourthiudicial District Cot 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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